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Early in March 1995, when the telephone call came from Jai Ram Reddy,
Fiji’s leader of the opposition and the long-term leader of the Indo-Fijian
c o m m u n i t y, asking me t o be h i s n o m i n e e on the Constitution R e v i ew C o m-
mission, I was naturally overwhelmed. The appointment was not unex-
p e c t ed—I had been asked several months earlier about my willingness to
s e rve—but the enormity of the task ahead dawned on me at that moment.
Many friends in Fiji had cautioned me. The review, they said, was a cha-
rade, a cynical exercise in public relations by a coup-tainted government
eager to refurbish its image in the eyes of the international community.
Rabuka was still Rabuka: leopards do not change their spots. The pres-
ence of Tomasi Vakatora—a member of the cabinet subcommittee whose
recommendations had formed the basis of the contested 1990 constitu-
tion—proclaimed the government’s real intention. But I was undeterred.
At a celebratory dinner with friends that evening, my son Niraj, then just
eleven, piped up proudly. “Dad,” he said innocently, “You have taught
history and written history. Now you can make history and then become
history.” Nervous laughter greeted his remark. 
Niraj was more prophetic than anyone of us realized. Four tumultuous
years after the commission completed its report, Fiji is back on the road
to ruin. The 1997 constitution, based on our commission’s report, unan-
imously approved by parliament, and blessed by the Great Council of
Chiefs, lies in limbo. A democratically elected government, with an abso-
lute majority, was ousted by a coup, the country subjected to a reign of
terror and violence unprecedented in Fiji’s history. The fabric of race rela-
tions, just beginning to be repaired after years of strain following the
coups of a decade earlier, is in tatters. The economy is down, and the best
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and the brightest are looking for greener pastures. The May coup and the
ensuing mayhem have taken Fiji back by a generation. As I write (in
November 2000), the people of Fiji are intensely debating the future
political direction of the country, including the formulation of a new con-
stitution.
The Fiji saga has received more than its share of regional and interna-
tional notice. Coups attract attention, for there is something deeply unset-
tling and immoral about using the bayonet to overturn the verdict of the
ballot box, not once but thrice in thirteen years, the first two as tragedy,
the third as farce. Fiji’s situation highlights dilemmas faced by other mul-
tiethnic countries in the developing world. What framework of govern-
ment is appropriate for multicultural, multiethnic nations like Fiji (or
Guyana or Malaysia)? How and in what ways should the constitution of
a country enlarge and enrich the common space of equal citizenship with-
out infringing on the unique and rich cultural and spiritual traditions of
the various components making up the larger society? Fiji’s case also raises
questions about the tension between the privileged claims of the first set-
tlers—the indigenous people—and those of the later arrivals. Should the
basis of political affiliation be blood rather than belief, primordiality
rather than ideology? Our commission provided a set of re c o m m e n d a t i o n s
to resolve these complex questions, but the latest coup-makers and their
supporters did not approve them. A vision has vanished beyond recall.
Between the beneficiaries of the coup in the interim administration and
those deposed from power, a war of words is raging to win the hearts and
m i n ds of t he l o c al people and of the intern a t i o n al c o m m u n i t y. T he d e p o s e d
government insists that any constitutional solution to the present crisis
should be sought within the framework of the 1997 constitution; its rein-
statement is for them a prerequisite for any future dialogue and reconcil-
iation. But the coup supporters insist that the 1997 constitution is dead
and buried and that a fresh start, favoring indigenous Fijian interests and
needs, is necessary to resolve the crisis.1 What the outcome will be re m a i n s
unclear. I am unconvinced that the constitution has failed the people of
Fiji. More to the point, the people of Fiji have failed the constitution. It
will take many years of toil and tears to recover what Fiji has lost in its
moment of madness, just as it did following the 1987 coups.
The destroyers of the 1997 constitution have advanced many arg u m e n t s
to support their cause. To begin with, George Speight and his supporters
circulated a twenty-six-point document to the Great Council of Chiefs
soon after hijacking parliament.2 Their main points were that the 1997
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constitution was not in the interests of the Fijian people, as seen in the
rejection of it by a majority of the Fijian provinces; that it was not prop-
erly explained to the Fijian people; and that it was introduced by stealth.
The democratic principles that the constitution enshrines were, in their
view, foreign flowers unsuited to Fijian soil and antithetical to the central
tenets of indigenous Fijian society. They further claimed that Chaudhry
was “Indianising” the public sector by appointing more Indo-Fijians to
senior positions. Chaudhry, they said, had “a long history of arguing for
racial equality under the umbrella of democracy whilst pursuing an
underlying secret agenda of entrenching the interests of Indians in Fiji as
supreme.” The prime minister was confrontational in his style and insen-
sitive to Fijian interests and concerns, particularly in relation to the ever-
sensitive issue of land. His government, they complained, had “contrib-
uted to the impoverishment and disaffection of indigenous Fijians and his
rule was the culmination of thirty fraught years of modern indigenous
Fijian leadership that have sacrificed the economic and cultural well being
of Fijians for the advancement of a few.” In short, both the constitution
and the government elected under it failed to serve the interests of the
indigenous people and so had to be removed by force. Speight and his gun-
men did what most Fijians had secretly desired. Speight should thus be
treated as a hero and not as a treasonous criminal.
T h e re are two sets of issues here, one constitutional and the other polit-
ical; one involving the rules and regulations of government, and the other
dealing with the way the party in government promulgated policies pro m-
ised in their election manifesto and handled the business of administration.
The two have often conveniently been conflated in Fiji, the shortcomings
of the government of the day hitched to the supposed shortcomings of the
constitution, and the constitution blamed for the outcome of the election.
The coupling of the two is a politically expedient but unconvincing ploy;
they must be separated and considered separately.
The 1997 constitution was not introduced by stealth, preceded as it
was by the most comprehensive process of review and consultation ever
carried out in Fiji, far more even than the 1970 constitution. This process
began with the appointment of the Constitution Review Commission (see
Lal 1998). Its members were chosen by parliament, which also drew up the
c o m m i s s i o n ’s terms of re f e rence. These re q u i red the commission to re v i e w
the 199 0 constitution and produce a re p o rt recommending constitutional
arrangements that would meet the present and future needs of the people
of Fiji; promote racial harmony, national unity, and the economic and
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social advancement of all communities; take into account internationally
recognized principles and standards of individual and group rights; guar-
antee full protection and promotion of the rights, interests, and concerns
of the indigenous Fijian and Rotuman people; and have full regard for the
rights, interests, and concerns of all ethnic groups in Fiji.
The commission itself consulted widely. It traveled to all the provinces
and major settlements throughout the group and received well over eight
hundred written and oral submissions from individuals, nongovernment
organizations, church and community groups, and all the major political
parties. These submissions were printed in the media and broadcast over
television and radio. The commission also requested research papers from
local as well as overseas experts on the matters it was called to consider.
These papers, too, were published.3 In addition, the commission visited
t h ree countries with constitutional arrangements that had some bearing on
the Fiji case, including Malaysia, a multiracial country with a significant
indigenous population enjoying constitutionally guaranteed affirmative
action policies; Mauritius, a small island state in the Indian Ocean whose
constitutional structure had facilitated enviable economic growth that far
outstripped Fiji’s (although at the time of independence in 1968 it had
lagged behind Fiji in virtually every sphere); and South Africa which, in
the mid-1990s, was engaged in a massive effort to formulate an appro-
priate constitution to facilitate the change from apartheid to a multiparty
democracy.
The commission’s thoroughness and sensitivity received wide praise
both locally and intern a t i o n a l ly. Introducing the re p o rt to parliament,
President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara commended the commissioners “first
for their willingness to undertake this important task, and second for the
devotion and commitment they and their staff have shown in accom-
plishing it. We are all very much in their debt.” Prime Minister Sitiveni
Rabuka extended his “warmest gratitude and congratulations for a work
well done,” and went on, “The Commission had painstakingly canvassed
views and consulted widely throughout Fiji. With meticulous care and
with patience, they then compiled their report. The unanimity with which
they have submitted their recommendations clearly demonstrates the seri-
ousness with which they had approached their task, and their determina-
tion to speak as one is suggesting to us the best way forward for our
country.” Opposition Leader Jai Ram Reddy was equally fulsome in his
praise of a “thorough and comprehensive document.”4 Internationally,
the commission’s modus operandi was recommended by the Common-
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wealth Secretariat and the United Nations’ Electoral Assistance Division
as a model for other constitutional review exercises.
A multipart y, multiethnic Joint Parliamentary Select Committee consid-
e red the commission’s report for a whole year, before producing a report
that formed the basis of the constitution, was debated in parliament, and
was approved unanimously. Subsequently, the Great Council of Chiefs
blessed the document unre s e rv e d l y. It is true that many provincial councils
had rejected the commission’s re p o rt at the instigation of leaders opposed
to the review process. But the same people were also members of parlia-
ment, indeed members of the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee that
had approved the constitution, as well as members of the Great Council
of Chiefs.
Nor is it valid to argue that the constitution could not be understood by
ordinary people because it was not translated into the Fijian language (or
Hindi, for that matter). Translating a complex document like a constitu-
tion is not an easy task, although the Citizens Constitutional Forum, a
nongovernment organization, explained its basic features in all the three
principal languages of Fiji. More important, the people who worked
against the constitution were not ord i n a ry, unlettered Fijians, but members
of parliament who understood the document and had voted for it.
Is democracy a foreign flower unsuited to Fijian soil? It is of course tru e
that democracy is foreign to Fiji, but so too are some of the most cherished
institutions and practices of modern Fijian society (see Lal 1992b, 97–99).
The Fijian state itself is a creation of British colonialism, for before the
middle of the nineteenth century, the islands of Fiji comprised a warring
collection of matanitu (traditional confederacies), clamoring for political
supremacy, a semblance of which was eventually achieved under Ratu
Seru Cakobau, the self-styled king of Fiji. Christianity, too, is a foreign
flower, having arrived in the islands via Tonga in 1835. The Great Coun-
cil of Chiefs, the powerful umbrella organization of traditional Fijian lead-
ers, and the established principles of Fijian land tenure are both, in dif-
ferent degrees, foreign flowers in Fiji. 
The advocates of the foreign-flower argument ignore the fact that Fiji
had practiced a kind of democracy since independence in 1970. The legit-
imacy of democracy was not questioned then because the Fijian establish-
ment always won. Only when they lost power—in 1987 and in 1999—
was the issue raised. Even the interim administration does not question the
validity of a democratic form of government for Fiji. They simply want a
democracy that will always put Fijians—or more corre c t l y, the most vocal
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sections of them—in power. The independence constitution, and those
that followed it, did include provisions that became entrenched, eff e c t i v e l y
quarantining indigenous Fijian interests from general public debate, and
giving the power of veto over them to the re p resentatives of the Gre a t
Council of Chiefs in the Senate. That was as it should be, and those pro-
tective provisions were the product of national consensus. If Fiji jettisons
democracy and all that it re p re s e n ts—the sovereignty of parliament as the
repository of the people’s will, an independent judiciary, an impartial civil
s e rv i ce—what alternative will be put in its place? Monarchy? Ethnocracy?
Theocracy?
Some coup supporters argued that the 1997 constitution did not pro t e c t
the “paramountcy of Fijian interests.” These words have a peculiar origin
in Fijian history, their significance distorted by meanings invested in them
b y d i ff e re n t g ro u p s o v er t he y e a r s . Many have mistakenly traced t h em b a c k
to the Deed of Cession in 1874, by which Fiji became a Crown colony.
Those words are not found there; instead, the document re c o rds the chiefs’
d e s i re to “tender unconditionally” the sovereignty of the islands to Queen
Victoria and her successors, “relying upon the justice and generosity” of
Her Majesty in dealing with her subject peoples. Cession, the chiefs hoped,
would promote “civilization” and “Christianity”—both foreign flowers
—in the islands along with a secure and stable government—another for-
eign flower. In turn the Crown promised that “the rights and interests of
the said Tui Viti and other high chiefs the ceding parties hereto shall be
recognised so far as is and shall be consistent with British Sovereignty and
Colonial form government.” This is paramountcy within parameters. In
early colonial usage, “paramountcy of Fijian interests” meant the protec-
tion (and the insulation) of those institutions and social practices that had
a particular significance to the Fijian people—their land tenure system,
“native policies” designed to preserve the neotraditional structure of their
society, a separate system of administration, matters of chiefly titles and
genealogies. On these matters, the view of the Fijian people, expressed
through the Great Council of Chiefs, prevailed. The European planters
invoked the principle of Fijian paramountcy in the 1920s, not to support
Fijians, but to halt political equality demanded by Indo-Fijians. Nonethe-
less, until the middle of the twentieth century, the words were used in a
protective sense. 
That changed when independence became imminent in the 196 0s. Then,
Fijian leaders began to interpret the “paramountcy of Fijian interests” to
mean “political paramountcy,” as was most forcefully articulated in 1964
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in the now famous “Wakaya Letter” (reprinted in Lal 1992a, 189). In it,
Fijian leaders laid down preconditions for further political change toward
g reater internal self-government, including declaring Fiji a Christian state,
seeking security of landownership, demanding Fijian parity in the public
service, and recognizing a continuing constitutional link with Britain, a
link “forged in a spirit of mutual trust and goodwill that should never be
severed,” and “building on and strengthening the spirit and substance of
the Deed of Cession.” The letter was a negotiating document, and a suc-
cessful one. The 1965 constitution gave Fijians two additional seats over
the Indo-Fijians, thus upsetting the principle of balance that had under-
pinned the colonial pattern of political re p resentation, and sowing seeds
of further political instability for the remainder of the 1960s. The 1970
constitution camouflaged the issue through a complex system of political
representation. Fijians and Indo-Fijians each had 22 seats in a 52-seat
lower house, 10 elected on national or cross-voting seats and 12 on
straight communal seats. General voters had 8 seats. Because general vot-
ers tended to side with Fijians and the Indo-Fijian community was prone
to splitting, the dominance of the Fijian leadership was ensured. But
beyond politics, paramount chiefs were at the helm of national leader-
ship—Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, Ratu Sir George
Cakobau, and Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau—assuring Fijians of continuity
with the past.
The conventional wisdom of communal compartmentalization that
underpinned Fiji’s political system—that ethnicity would drive the engine
of party politics—was threatened by social and economic developments
and the widespread changes they brought in their wake (eg, see Taylor
1986). Modern, multiracial education opened new doors. Urban drift
introduced people to new and often unsettling challenges. The video and
then the electronic revolution introduced ideas and values once alien or
inaccessible. Improved communications and increased cash cropping in
rural areas brought the subsistence sector more centrally into the modern,
monetary economy. New horizons opened, more opportunities presented
themselves, and old assumptions about politics changed. New ideas man-
ifested themselves in the emergence in 1985 of a multiracial Fiji Labour
Party whose nonracial social and economic philosophy challenged the old
order. Seen this way, the coups of 1987 represented an effort to turn the
clock back, by force.
Three years later, the post-coup administration decreed a new consti-
tution weighted in favor of the indigenous Fijians to “realise the aims of
dialogue • l a l 155
the coup.” Important offices of state, including that of the prime minister,
were reserved for them. Special, racially exclusive affirmative action pro-
grams for Fijians and Rotumans were legislated. And in parliament, the
indigenous Fijians enjoyed an outright majority of seats, with 3 7 of the 7 1
seats in the House of Representatives. For indigenous Fijians election to
p a r l i a m e n t t o o k p l a c e f ro m t h e i r t r a d i t i o n al p ro v i n c e s ; u r b an F i j i a n s , m o re
than a third of the Fijian population, were severely underre p re s e n t e d . Wi t h
rural weighting and an outright parliamentary majority, the architects of
the 1990 constitution hoped that Fijians would always remain in power,
that Fijian political paramountcy would prevail. That did not eventuate.
Soon after its formation, a party backed by the Great Council of Chiefs,
the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (sv t), splintered, with rival par-
ties forming to contest its legitimacy, including the Mara-backed Fijian
Association Party and the All National Congress launched by Apisai Tora
in the west. Part of the fragmentation arose from dissatisfaction with
Rabuka’s erratic leadership, part from regional factionalism, and part
f rom class tensions—Rabuka, a commoner, had beaten high Ro Lady Lala
Mara for the presidency of the new part y. Electing candidates from pro v-
inces encouraged provincial loyalties, paralyzing the operation of eff e c t i v e
p a rty politics with a national agenda and vision. Rabuka’s party won the
1992 election but not in sufficient numbers to form a government on its
own. It could do so only with the support of the Fiji Labour Party, backed
in the main by the Indo-Fijian community, the very people so recently
deposed.
The clear lesson of 1990 was that Fijian numerical supremacy in parlia-
ment was no guarantee of Fijian political paramountcy. This fact was fur-
ther clearly demonstrated in the 1999 elections, when Fijian fragmenta-
tion reached epidemic proportions with some twelve ethnic Fijian parties
contesting the election (see Lal 2000). Division among the Fijians, not
political unity among Indo-Fijians, led to the fall of the Rabuka govern-
ment. Since the coup of 19 May 2 0 0 0, regionalism and confederacy-based
politics have become rife, dividing the Fijian community as never before,
and not likely to end anytime soon. Other factors must be noted: Pre c i s e l y
what constitutes “the Fijian interest,” besides those items already given
watertight protection in the 1997 constitution, remains unclear. Fijian
interests are more diffuse now than ever before. Over 40 percent of the
indigenous population now resides in urban and periurban areas, exposed
to all the challenges of living in a complex monetary economy. Increas-
ingly, their needs are not the needs of their rural counterparts. Weighting
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representation in parliament in favor of the rural dwellers—as election
from the provinces will inevitably entail—will marginalize urban Fijians
even more. 
Given the diversity of Fijian society across class and region, the goal of
permanent political unity also puts enormous strains on the Fijian com-
m u n i t y. It is difficult, if not impossible, the Constitution Review Commis-
sion argued, for one party to accommodate the multiplicity of interests
that embrace Fijians. The quest for political unity also puts strains on tra-
ditional institutions. The Great Council of Chiefs’ sponsorship of one
political party divided the Fijians, who wanted the council to provide lead-
ership to all Fijians irrespective of political affiliation. The emphasis on
Fijian unity also means that Fijians will not be free to vote out a Fijian
government if it does not deliver what they expect. Those expectations go
beyond fulfillment of the government’s election promises to improve the
conditions of life for Fijians, who, like other citizens, want the same stan-
dards of integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness from those they elect. The
idea that a Fijian government must be maintained in office at all costs has
grave consequences for political accountability. It re q u i res setting aside the
normal democratic controls on a government’s performance in office, and
this is bad for the Fijian community as well as for the country as a whole. 
Supporters of the coups have invoked various international instru-
ments on indigenous rights in support of their claim for political para-
mountcy. Their argument rests on a misreading of these instruments. The
conventions most commonly cited in support are ILO Convention No 169
on Indigenous and Tribal Pe o p l e s and the draft “Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.” 5 The I LO Convention was adopted in June 1989
as a revision of ILO Convention No 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Popu-
lations. Convention 107 was based on the assumption that all relevant
decisions on the living and working conditions of indigenous and tribal
peoples would be taken into account by the government and that even-
tually the indigenous and tribal peoples would be assimilated into the
broader community. But the goal and philosophy of assimilation has been
discredited, and Convention 169 accepts that the indigenous and tribal
peoples will continue to enjoy a separate cultural identity within the
national society. The draft declaration provides for greater autonomy for
these groups within states where they and their lands are now situated.
These and other instruments apply, or are intended to apply, to indigenous
and tribal communities whose lands, culture, and separate identity are at
risk of marginalization as a result of colonization, such as the Hawaiians,
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the Mori, and Australian Aborigines, as well as tribal groups in North
and South America. For that reason, they are not wholly relevant to indig-
enous Fijians, who have always enjoyed autonomy in the management of
their administrative affairs and are secure in the possession of their lands
and a vibrant cultural identity.
At the heart of these instruments lie two ideas: that indigenous peoples
will remain a distinct community, and that they will enjoy equal rights
with other members of society. The clear implication is that at the national
level the political and other rights of the indigenous and tribal peoples are
on exactly the same footing as those of other members of the national soci-
e t y. Both instruments see the special rights of indigenous peoples as dis-
tinct communities as supplementing the fundamental human rights and
freedoms they already share with all other citizens. Nothing in either
instrument gives an indigenous people superior or paramount rights in
participating in the government of their society. Sometimes, indigenous
activists raise the issue of “self-d e t e rm i n a t i o n.” The declaration (Article 3)
states, “Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.” But the phrase “freely
determine their political status” refers to their political status in taking
control of their own affairs, not to their political status as it affects their
participation in the national government. The article does not sanction
secession. Nor does “self-determination” authorize a particular “people”
within a country, whether or not indigenous, to exercise political domina-
tion over other “peoples” as citizens. No political community, by re f e re n c e
to either “self-determination” or “sovereignty,” can legitimately claim it
has political rights that entitle it to a position of dominance over other
groups forming part of the same national society.
The word rights is often used in conjunction with sovereignty and self-
determination. What are Fijian rights? An important Fijian right is the
right to own land. This is guaranteed through the recognition of custom-
ary title in the Native Land Act. The Native Land Trust Act provides that
Fijians may not dispose of their lands except to the government through
the Native Land Trust Board. Fijian traditional fishing rights are pro-
tected by the Fisheries Act. And the constitution gives all landowners,
including indigenous Fijians, the right to a share of the royalties from the
exploitation of minerals in the subsoil of their land or the seabed over
which they have traditional fishing rights. Fijians also have rights to their
traditional institutions, including the Great Council of Chiefs, and other
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separate administrative systems set up for their governance under the
Fijian Affairs Act. The 1997 constitution for the first time recognized the
council as a constitutional body and empowered it to nominate both the
president and the vice president of the republic. The separate system of
Fijian administration is also protected. But political paramountcy is, and
cannot be, a right. As mentioned, international standards, including the
two instruments dealing with indigenous peoples, and the concepts of
“self-determination” and “sovereignty” give no support to that proposi-
tion.
Some Fijians also argue that they have a “right” to affirmative action
programs. This is a complex area involving an interplay of many percep-
tions about the present circumstances of different communities; the phi-
losophy of giving state assistance to individuals by reason of their mem-
bership in a particular community or gro up; the principles on which
appointments should be made to public service; how programs for the
benefit of a particular community or groups are reconciled with the right
of equality before the law and freedom from discrimination on the consti-
tutionally prohibited grounds; the desirable balance between the re s o u rc e s
used for those purposes and other social justice programs for the needy
members of all communities; and the question of whether the assistance
given to enhance the position of particular communities and groups
achieves the desired results.
Nonetheless, affirmative action for the indigenous Fijians was an
accepted fact of public policy in post-independence Fiji. Since the 1970s,
for example, following the report of the 1969 Education Commission, 50
p e rcent of all government scholarships for tert i a ry education was re s e rv e d
for them on a parallel-block basis, despite demonstrably inferior perfor-
mance. The Fiji Development Bank initiated a number of commercial and
business schemes to assist indigenous Fijians in the commercial sector
(Lal 1992a, 232–235), a function that the National Bank of Fiji assumed
between 1987 and 1995. After 1987, the government set up special funds
to purchase freehold lands and give them back to the indigenous land-
owners. And a special scholarship fund was set up by the Fijian Affairs
Board to help indigenous Fijian students gain tertiary qualifications. The
results of these efforts did not match expectations. The 1990 Constitution
explicitly provided for affirmative action for indigenous Fijians and Rotu-
mans. Section 21, entitled “Protection and Enhancement of Fijian and
Rotuman Interests,” authorized and directed parliament to put in place
affirmative action programs for their benefit: “Parliament shall, with the
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object of promoting and safeguarding the economic, social, educational,
cultural, traditional and other interests of the Fijian and Rotuman people,
enact laws for those objects and shall direct the Government to adopt any
p rogramme or activity for the attainment of the said objectives.” The cab-
inet could authorize government departments and statutory commissions
to reserve scholarships and other training opportunities and business per-
mits and licenses to attain the aims of the section. The constitution also
contained specific provisions that sought to secure a minimum 50 percent
representation of Fijians and Rotumans in departments and among the
holders of judicial and legal offices.
There is no quarrel with the principle of affirmative action, but the
selective manner of its application, as well as the failure to reach expec-
tations, has become a bone of contention. No matter of sensitive public
policy such as affirmative action can succeed without public or national
consensus. In the case of post-coup Fiji, no such consensus existed. Nor
is any program of this kind likely to succeed unless the specific goals, and
the means through which they are to be achieved, are clearly indicated.
To succeed, there must be performance indicators for judging the efficacy
of the program in achieving its goals, and criteria for selecting the indi-
viduals who will be entitled to the privileges and advantages. A blanket
“Fijian” or “Rotuman” criterion is not good enough because, as men-
tioned, these communities are as diverse as others in the distribution of
wealth among them. Prescribing ethnicity as the sole criterion for affirma-
tive action is problematic for other reasons as well. For one, it ignores
other criteria, such as gender; and women are grossly underrepresented in
the public sector. For another, it assumes that other communities, in par-
ticular the Indo-Fijians, do not need affirmative action. This is not true, as
the level of Indo-Fijian participation in the public sector has been declin-
ing markedly. In 1985, Fijians made up 46.4 percent of established pub-
lic servants, Indo-Fijians 48 percent, and general voters and expatriates
5.6 percent. The corresponding figures in 1995 were Fijians 57.3 percent,
Indo-Fijians 38.6 percent, and general voters and expatriates 4.1 percent.
In 1995, of the 31 permanent secretaries, 22 were Fijians, 6 Indo-Fijians,
and 3 were general voters. Furthermore, virtually every study of income
levels and poverty in Fiji in recent years has shown that, among Fijian and
Indo-Fijian households, each group has a roughly comparable percentage
living in poverty.6 Although incomes of Indo-Fijian households, on the
whole, were higher than those of Fijian households, income disparity was
significantly greater among Indo-Fijian households.
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The Fiji Constitution Review Commission there f o re recommended that
the government “put in place not only affirmative action programmes for
the benefit of the Fijian and Rotuman people, but similar programmes for
other ethnic communities, and for women, and for all other disadvantaged
citizens or groups in the Republic of the Fiji Islands.” The Compact of the
1997 constitution (Section k) agreed that “affirmative action and social
justice programmes to secure effective equality of access to opportunities,
amenities or services for the Fijian and Rotuman people, as well as for
other communities, for women as well as men, and for all disadvantaged
citizens or groups, are based on an allocation of resources broadly accept-
able to all communities.” The phrase “broadly acceptable to all commu-
nities” is important: it implies consensus as well as the principle of pro-
portionality. In effect it means that since the Fijian and Rotuman people
now constitute more than 50 percent of the population they are legiti-
mately entitled to 50 percent of affirmative action resources.
The current interim administration has proposed reimplementation of
a race-based affirmative action.7 It has promised to establish a Fijian and
Rotuman Trust Fund to support indigenous development projects; to start
a national saving scheme for Fijians and Rotumans to finance increased
Fijian equity and other forms of participation in business as well as invest-
ment in education; to give tax exemptions to Fijian companies for an
unspecified period; to set up a Fijian Development Trust Fund and a Fijian
Education Fund to provide scholarships to students and grants to Fijian
schools; and to reserve for indigenous Fijians 50 percent of government
shares in commercial companies, 50 percent of all licenses and permits,
and 50 percent of all government contracts. All this in addition to trans-
f e rring all Crown Schedule A and B lands to the Native Land Trust Board
and establishing a Lands Claims Tribunal to deal with long-standing
claims for native lands acquired for public purposes. These proposals are
designed to appease the Fijian nationalist fringe: the interim administra-
tion wants to be seen to be implementing policies that favor Fijians. But
such policies and initiatives have been in place for a long time and have
failed to deliver the desired outcome. It must be asked whether more
affirmative action is the answer, or are the problems—in the commercial
field, for example—more deep-seated and culturally based than money
alone can remedy? And what of the principles of efficiency, a c c o u n t-
a b i l i t y, transpare n c y, merit, and effective delivery of state services? Playing
the “race” card, blaming other ethnic groups for the poor perf o rmance of
indigenous Fijians, as is often done, is no longer convincing. Deeper soul
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searching about the role of culture and tradition would yield more fruit-
ful results.
In my opinion, then, the 1997 constitution did not fail. The people of
Fiji failed the constitution. The next question is: Did the People’s Coali-
tion government fail, or in some way dilute Fijian interests? The People’s
Coalition government included disparate political parties with diverse
interests and agendas (see Lal 1999). They came together not necessarily
because of a shared vision for the nation but because of what might be
termed “negative” sentiments. The Fijian parties in the coalition joined
with the Labour Party because they wanted Rabuka out of office as pun-
ishment for the sorry record of his government in the 1990s, tainted as it
was by mismanagement, corruption, indecisive leadership, and the scan-
dals in his private life. They also opposed the 1997 constitution, which
Rabuka, working closely with Jai Ram Reddy, had been instrumental in
shepherding through parliament. The Christian Democratic Alliance, a
member of the People’s Coalition, wanted Fiji to become a Christian state
and wanted the constitution to be revised to address Fijian concerns, espe-
cially the issue of Fijian political paramountcy. Soon after forming a gov-
ernment, rifts emerged in the coalition. A faction of the Fijian Association
P a rty opposed the government in which its own leader, Adi Kuini Bavadra
Speed, was the deputy prime minister. And Apisai Tora, the founding
leader of another coalition partner, the Party of National Unity, attacked
the prime minister and opposed the government even though two of his
own colleagues were members of the cabinet. So the coalition govern m e n t
was hobbled by internal criticism and division that threatened its unity
and cohesiveness.
The Labour Party was the dominant partner in the coalition, with 37
o u t of t he 7 1 s e a t s g i v i n g it an outright majority in p a r l i a m e n t . But because
the constitution prescribed compulsory power sharing in cabinet—a n y
political party with more than 1 0 p e rcent of seats in parliament was enti-
tled to be invited to join the govern m e nt—C h a u d h ry ’s hands were tied: he
h a d to s h a re p o w e rw i t h p a rt i e s not in his coalition. As leader of the larg e s t
party in parliament, Chaudhry became prime minister, although several
of his own colleagues would have preferred an indigenous Fijian in that
o f fi c e .P e rh a ps t he m a n n e r in w h i c h he attained that office might h a ve b e e n
different, through more consultation and dialogue, but Chaudhry did the
right thing. The fact that President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara persuaded
recalcitrant Fijian parties to rally behind Chaudhry (in whose govern m e n t
Mara’s own family members were ministers), raised suspicions among
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Fijians long distrustful of Mara’s rule about his dynastic ambitions for
himself and his traditional power base in the eastern parts of Fiji. Chau-
dhry’s ability to secure the president’s support, along with that of factions
of Fijian parties in his coalition (successfully practicing the kind of poli-
tics Fijian leaders had played with the Indo-Fijian community since inde-
pendence), was seen, rightly or wrongly, as a strategy to divide the
Fijians.
Chaudhry’s own personal style compounded problems. An intelligent
and battle-hardened trade union leader, he had been the single most pain-
ful thorn in the side of post-coup regimes, his uncompromising defense of
the trade union movement and the principles of nonracial democracy
earning him enemies among important, unforgiving sections of the Fijian
community. Although more Fijians than Indo-Fijians were in the cabinet,
there was no doubt in his opponents’ minds that real power was wielded
by Chaudhry, who himself controlled the portfolios of prime minister,
minister of finance, sugar, public service, and information. Such central-
ization was consistent with his personal style of leadership as well as a
tacit acknowledgement of dearth of ministerial talent in his coalition.
Some of his decisions invited public censure, such as appointing his own
son, not a civil servant, as his personal secretary on the public payroll. He
was criticized for practicing the very kind of nepotism he had condemned
while in opposition, and the perception of a government that favored its
own grew among those already disapproving of it. The government’s con-
frontational approach to the media did not help matters. To every criti-
cism and every opposition, the government responded with the mantra: it
had the people’s mandate to implement policies promised in its manifesto.
Of course, the government did have the mandate, but astute political lead-
ership in Fiji would have understood that parliamentary mandate is one
among several mandates in Fiji. Repeated invocation of the mantra of
mandates irritated those already fearful of the government’s huge major-
ity in parliament. The government’s hectic legislative program, institu-
tional reforms, and the shedding of deadwood from the public sector
heightened those fears.
The issue that raised the greatest emotion was land—not its ownership,
but the imminent expiry of thirty-year leases granted under the Agricul-
tural Land and Tenant Act, first passed in 1969. Some Fijian landowners
wanted their land back, either to cultivate it themselves, to rezone it for
commercial or residential purposes, or to use the threat of nonrenewal to
extract more rent from their tenants. They were led by Marika Qarikau,
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head of the Native Land Trust Board, an abrasive, hardline nationalist
who used every means possible, from addressing the provincial councils to
using the network of the Fijian Methodist Church, to rally the landowners
behind him and against the government. The government did not contest
the right of the landowners to reclaim their land, but neither could it
ignore the plight of tenants, most unskilled, poor, uneducated, evicted
from the land, thus causing a massive social problem for the country. The
government offered the displaced tenants f$28,000 to get started in some
other occupation, and the landlords f$8,000 to equip themselves as cul-
tivators. It was a pragmatic interim solution to an intractable problem. 
At the same time, the government attempted to establish a Land Use
Commission to work with landowners to identify idle lands that could be
put to productive use, including, if possible, resettling displaced tenants
on them. With Qarikau on the warpath, the government went directly to
the landowners, and sent a delegation of chiefs to Malaysia (Sarawak) to
familiarize themselves with the work of a similar commission there and
to dispel any fears they might have about the government’s intentions. To
everyone’s surprise, the chiefs returned impressed, but by then Qarikau
had already orchestrated an unqualified rejection of the proposal from
many provincial councils. Qarikau feared that if the concept of a Land
Use Commission were accepted, the power of his own political base, the
Native Land Trust Board, might be irredeemably impaired. With provin-
cial criticism swirling, the government did what it should have done in
the first place: it took the proposal to the Great Council of Chiefs, which
blessed it and asked the government and the board to work cooperatively
to finalize the details.
This hard-fought victory was short-lived, for just as the government
felt it was gaining the upper hand over its critics, protest marches began
around the country, led in virtually every instance by defeated politicians
—Ratu Tevita Bolobolo and Apisai Tora among others. The protests
gained momentum, energized by the government’s dismissive stance
toward the marches as the work of a few misguided miscreants. The cry
Fijian Rights in Danger rallied many behind the reinvigorated Taukei
Movement, and roadblocks and threatening antigovernment banners
went up. The climax came on 19 May when George Speight and six other
armed gunmen hijacked parliament, tore up the constitution, and
unleashed a reign of terror and violence on an unsuspecting population.
Even if the Chaudhry government was not everyone’s choice, even if it
was drunk on the power of its numbers in parliament, to justify a coup
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on these grounds is plainly untenable. For, if style were the criterion, then
coups would be the order of the day in many of the most advanced democ-
racies of the world. Saying that just because Chaudhry was unacceptable
to the nationalists no other Indo-Fijian should ever aspire to lead the gov-
ernment of Fiji equally boggles the mind. Whether it realized it or not, the
Chaudhry government was forced to share the political space with com-
peting centers of power. No law affecting the indigenous Fijians could be
changed without the support of the nominees of the Great Council of
Chiefs in the Senate. The Fijian Affairs Act specified the rules and proce-
dures for the governance of indigenous Fijians. The power of the Native
Land and Fisheries Commission to adjudicate ownership disputes among
indigenous Fijians was absolute. The Chaudhry government did not
threaten to cancel programs put in place for indigenous Fijians by previ-
ous governments; it merely asked for more accountability and transpar-
ency in their administration.
In one respect, however, the People’s Coalition government did thre a t e n
the established habits of thought and political behavior in Fiji. In however
small a way, its emphasis on nonracial solutions to the country’s deep-
seated social and economic problems threatened to undermine the way of
thinking that has long seen the country’s problems and remedies through
the prism of race and ethnicity. Those who viewed race not only as a
“fact” of life but also as a “way” of life saw the Chaudhry government as
undermining a system that had kept them in positions of power for more
than a generation. Over the years, many had been led to believe that only
a Fijian prime minister, not an Indo-Fijian one, could be trusted to govern
the country and maintain the security of Fijian interests. Chaudhry ’s suc-
cess, as seen in soaring public opinion polls on the eve of the coup in May,
would have undermined a fundamental tenet of their beliefs. Chaudhry
had to go before he and his vision for Fiji became too deeply entre n c h e d .
The interim administration has proposed a new constitution, which it
says must enshrine Fijian political paramountcy. In his address to the
United Nations in September 2000, Interim Prime Minister Qarase hinted
at the kinds of things that the constitution might include. Because over 50
percent of the population is Christian, Fiji might be declared a Christian
state. Qarase also said that the amount and value of landownership should
also be reflected in the composition of parliament. The Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei is more specific.8 Indigenous Fijians, it says, must have
70 percent of all parliamentary seats; Fijian culture and language should
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be made the national language and culture; the first-past-the-post system
should be used in national voting rather than the alternative voting system
p re s c r i b e d in t h e 1997 c o n s t i t u t i o n ; o p e n ( n o n r a c i a l) seats should be t u rn e d
into national seats (that is, cross-voting seats where the ethnicity of the
candidate is specified but all vote); and there should be greater decentral-
ization of political, fiscal, and administrative stru c t u res. The salience of
these points can be debated at length—can a small island state like Fiji, for
example, aff o rd the financial burden of more decentralization? Why have
national seats when everyone knows them to be compromised and dis-
credited? Why use the first-past-the-post system when it is universally
re g a rded as obsolete? Why give the Fijian people the right to vote and then
insist that they vote for only Fijian candidates? Decentralization is fine in
theory, but Indo-Fijians are excluded from Fijian provincial and district
councils.
The real issue underlying the demands of the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa
ni Taukei is Fijian political paramountcy. A Fijian must be the head of
state, and of government, and if possible of important statutory positions
as well. Fiji has traveled that route before, under the 1990 constitution,
with disastrous results. The question for the Fijian people is not whether
a Fijian must be the head of government, but which, or what kind of,
Fijian. For some, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was the “wrong” kind of Fijian
l e a d e r. Others rejected Sitiveni Rabuka because he was a commoner, albeit
an uncommon one. Dr Timoci Bavadra, too, could not be trusted by
everyone. For yet others, George Speight (now calling himself Ilikini Nai-
tini) is an unacceptable face of Fijian nationalism. Increasingly, too, many
Fijians are thinking in terms of their provinces and confederacies, all want-
ing to take turns at the helm of the ship of state. Taking turns: that is what
the debate is about, not about social, economic, and national development
in an era of unprecedented change and globalization. 
Now, Fijians will take turns without the “threat” of Indo-Fijian dom-
inance. Thousands of Indo-Fijians left the country after the coups of 1987,
and now many more will leave, depriving the country of much-needed tal-
ent and skills. The reduced number of Indo-Fijians will open up space for
m o re debate among Fijians as provincial, regional, and confederacy ten-
sions and rivalries come to the fore, as they have already begun to do since
19 May 2 0 0 0. Their situation is aggravated by the absence on the national
scene of experienced and trusted leaders with overarching national influ-
ence. The departure of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara has brought to an end the
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rule of paramount chiefs tutored for national leadership by the colonial
government in the years following the Second World War. The new gen-
eration of Fijian leaders is embroiled in local and regional politics, their
wider influence limited or tainted by involvement in the events of the last
decade or so. In the absence of any alternative, Fijian people may discover
the “foreign flower” of democracy as their political savior.
In recent months, I have often revisited in my mind the work of the Fiji
Constitution Review Commission. I continue to be inspired by its vision
of Fiji as a vibrant, multiethnic, democratic state that celebrates the indi-
geneity of Fiji, recognizes the equal rights of all citizens, maintains the
separation of church and state, provides a basis on which all citizens can
describe themselves by a common name, and encourages every community
to regard the major concerns of other communities as national, not sec-
tional, concerns. A multiethnic state, I fervently believe, should strive for
multiethnic government achieved through the voluntary cooperation of
political parties, or increased support for a genuinely multiethnic party. It
must recognize and celebrate the distinctive character of its diverse con-
stituent parts while enlarging the common space and opportunities of
equal citizenship. Consensus, not coercion, is the way forward to genuine
reconciliation. The Fijian powers that be may wish to turn back the clock,
but it would not do the clock any good. The Fijian tragedy once again
underlines the fundamental truth that those who do not learn from his-
tory are condemned to repeat it. 
Notes 
1 I draw on Interim Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase’s address to the United
Nations, 8 September 2000.
2 A copy of this document is in my possession courtesy of Australian Broad-
casting Commission’s chief diplomatic correspondent, Graeme Dobbell.
3 A selection of the papers can be found in Lal and Vakatora 1997.
4 The quotations are from Fiji 1997.
5 Here, to avoid misrepresentation, I follow the report of the Fiji Constitu-
tion Review Commission (Fiji 1997, 40–52).
6 Among them, reports by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.
An early analysis along these lines is Stavenuiter 1983.
7 This is from Qarase 2001.
8 A copy of the svt statement is available on the Fijilive Internet site:
http://www.fijilive.com/
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